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Abstract 
This essay is a short but impacting observation of the economy of the Middle Ages in light of 
recent economic historians’ discoveries: not only are some conventional beliefs such as the 
absence of a financial and trading economy of the period discredited, but a more nuanced 
view of feudalism also emerges from such revelations. The new, groundbreaking work of 
Michael McCormick is pitted against Henri Pirenne’s classic theory; in addition, seminal 
works by Marc Bloch, S.R. Epstein, and lesser known work by Aron Gurevich provide a more 
authentic view of Middle-Age economy. Finally, contrary to Marxist historiography, this 
essay postulates that to some extent feudalism fomented the development of capitalism. 
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Introduction 
 
The conceit that feudalism oppressed capitalistic enterprise, and that only its weakening 
allowed the emergence of capitalism is one we should outright abandon in its simple form.  
The debates on the origins of capitalism are a welter of contrasting views; the approaches are 
so varied (economic, social, political, anthropological, ethnographic, etc.), the opinions so 
disparate, and the scope so vast, that a consensus will probably never be reached.  Marxist 
historiography, which looms large over the theory for the rise of capitalism, in most cases, has 
envisioned capitalist development at the expense of feudalism; yet, the veracity of this thesis 
has been persuasively contradicted on account of its too rigid ideology; but even liberal 
economic historians like Pirenne may be faulted for having simplified a number of aspects of 
feudalism.  This paper will explore a few of these simplifications—in some cases outright 
misconceptions—against recent, groundbreaking discoveries, which have provided us with a 
more accurate understanding of the economy of the Middle Ages as well as a more nuanced 
view of feudalism. 
 
Pirenne and the Myth of a Trade-less Middle Ages 
 
Pirenne’s extensive work on the economy of the Middle Ages and its transformation has been 
fecund indeed: his theories about the rise of towns, burghers and the merchant class, their 
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pursuit for profit, and the general shift in the conception of richesse—from land-based wealth 
to financial wealth strictly measurable with money—stand against criticism and are still 
valuable today.  But his ideas on the feudal economy must be substantially revised.  
According to Pirenne, trade and commerce stimulated economic growth, and, eventually, 
capitalism; but Pirenne grossly underestimated the presence of trade in the early feudal age 
(800-1100)—a time, which he repeatedly insisted as being devoid of commercial activity: ‘Of 
a regular and normal commercial activity, of steady trading carried on by a class of 
professional merchants, in short, of all that constitutes the very essence of an economy of 
exchange worthy of the name, no traces can be found after the closing off of the 
Mediterranean by the Islamic invasion’ (Pirenne, 1925, p.35) 
 
In his classic Mohammed and Charlemagne, Pirenne continued his dismal portrait of 
economic regression in the Mediterranean: ‘The Mediterranean, having become a Musulman 
lake, was no longer the thoroughfare of commerce […] it had always been.’ (Pirenne, 1937, 
p.284)  Elsewhere, too, Pirenne made the same point more emphatically: ‘The economic 
organization which imposed itself upon Western Europe in the course of the Carolingian 
epoch […] was purely agricultural.  Not only did it know nothing of commerce, but one may 
say that […] it excluded the very possibility of any professional activity. (Pirenne, 1938, 
p.201)  Such sharp statements have been disproved.  
 
McCormick’s Innovative Views 
 
In 2002 Michael McCormick’s monumental Origins of the European Economy was published 
and fundamentally altered our view of the economy of the early Middle Ages; based on a 
gigantic amount of data, research, and investigation, McCormick’s book presents a very 
different picture indeed. 
 
In recent years, deeper scrutiny […] has revealed a more complex picture, with greater 
implications for transportation, markets, and commerce than once appeared.  Case studies of 
the transport of goods within four of the best documented of these domanial systems [Paris 
and the Seine; Moselle, western Germany; Lombardy; Po valley] bring out these implications 
well. […] In all four cases, close scrutiny has uncovered highly organized systems of 
communication between land and water. (McCormick, 2002, p.8) 
 
McCormick enumerates the large quantities of goods, ranging from cereal staple food to “high 
value products such as wine and iron tools” which were transported across Europe and 
beyond.  In addition, McCormick furnishes a number of tables1, which clearly show an 
increase in core movements of 140% during the ninth century and of 360% compared to the 
early eighth century, thus transforming our view of the Carolingian age.  In the massive 
appendices McCormick provides evidence that sanctions an antithetical statement to Pirenne’s 
thesis on the cessation of maritime commerce during the Carolingian era: ‘whether through 
intermediaries or direct communications, Carolingian Europe had entered into relations with 
the much larger economy of the Caliphate.’ (McCormick, 2002, p.569) 
 
As to Pirenne’s views of money and currency, they, too, are in need of revision: in addition to 
the striking amount of transalpine coin movements, McCormick and his army of researchers 
have uncovered more Carolingian coins than Pirenne supposed were in existence, and, though 
Pirenne acknowledged that the feudal economy was not exclusively based on barter exchange, 
he nevertheless minimized the commercial resilience of the ninth century by stating that, ‘[…] 
the Carolingian monarchy was now an agricultural state engaging in no commercial activity.’ 
(Pirenne, 1936, p.107)  But McCormick’s findings contradict Pirenne unequivocally: 
‘Overall, from the eighth century to the tenth, the general trend among great estates to 
monetize the dues of rural households has become unmistakable […] payments were 
increasingly defined in terms of money, not goods.’ (McCormick, 2002, p.9) 
 
                                                 
1
 See pp.435-7 & p.722 
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Feudalism as an Agent of Capitalism? 
 
The presence of money at such an early stage is also a direct blow to Marxist historian 
Maurice Dobb, whose thesis was that the growth of a money economy was a primary factor in 
the decline of feudalism—‘the market exercised a disintegrating influence on the structure of 
feudalism.’ (Dobb, 1947, p.70)  Paul Sweezy already criticized this assertion by maintaining 
that money economy alone was not responsible for the decline of feudalism, because a certain 
amount of trade is required even by the most primitive economies.  Sweezy, however, like 
Pirenne, thought that commerce fomented capitalistic development.  Thus, both historians’ 
argument for the underlying causes for the emergence of capitalism is sound, but, in the light 
of McCormick’s work, the argument runs into anachronisms.  In other words, trade and 
commerce were indeed a factor in the development of capitalism (though not the sole factor); 
and more importantly they were not the sole cause of feudalism’s demise—the traditional, 
long prevailing view.  In this regard, S.R. Epstein made a very important observation when 
stating that, ‘the principal threat to feudalism therefore did not come from trade; up to a point 
feudalism thrived on trade.’ (Epstein, 2000, p.50)  Yet we should not infer that at a certain 
point feudalism was not a hindrance to capitalist development: high trade costs, due to the 
‘jurisdictional parcellization’ of seigniorial power eventually inhibited economic expansion, 
for ‘strong feudal and urban jurisdiction was incompatible with long-run economic growth.’ 
(Epstein, 2000, p.51)  So it seems that feudalism had an altogether ambivalent role in the 
development of capitalism: on the one hand, feudalism with its ‘great estates stimulated trade’ 
(McCormick, 2002, p.9) and capital accumulation (as Max Weber had already suggested in 
Economy and Society), which are both essential prerequisites for capitalistic enterprise.  On 
the other, the prime movers’ mercantilist pursuits were eventually constrained by the feudal 
system’s seigniorial jurisdiction, inefficient manorial organizations, and exasperating tolls. 
  
A more authentic picture of the feudal economy reveals that it did not interdict the flourishing 
of commerce and trade. We ought to turn to a broader view of feudalism—away from the 
speculation of Marxist historians, who concentrate on the purely economic relationship of 
servitude between lord and serfs—and look to non-Marxist historians whose outlook on 
feudalism was based on socio-political conditions rather than on historical materialism.  And 
surely, older historians’ notions that the decline of feudalism was due to its absence of trade, 
such as the Stephenson’s statement that, ‘The decay of feudalism can therefore be understood 
as one phase of the economic revolution experienced by Western Europe between the 
eleventh and thirteenth centuries.  In the earlier period commerce had been reduced to little 
more than the local exchange of surplus produce […]’ (Stephenson, 1942, p.98) now seem 
irremediably dated. 
 
A More Nuanced View of Feudalism  
 
Aron Gurevich, in his profound work, Problems in the Origins of Feudalism in Western 
Europe, which sadly remains untranslated in English (and for which he was fired from the 
Moscow Institute of Philosophy for its challenges to Marxist theories), states that the Middle 
Ages were essentially a polystructural society and that serfdom was not a uniform blanket 
subjugating all un-free men, as Marxist historians portrayed: 
 
What is important is the fact that at the end of the early middle Ages this diversity of the 
social structures did not vanish.  Next to the independent farmers and feudal proprietors, 
almost everywhere we can detect a stratum of small, free landowners—of petty proprietors, 
which constituted a considerable portion of the population. […] Nowhere, not even in France, 
did the fief supplant the allodial tenement.  […] Serfdom during the feudal epoch was never a 
completely uniform class in its economic identity, its socio-juridical status, or its role in the 
social and political life; serfs were splintered in countless categories, each distinguished by its 
forms of dependence and the various types of exploitation it suffered.2 (Gurevich, 1982, p.14). 
                                                 
2
 Translated by me from the Italian edition. Original edition: Aron Gurevich, Problemy genezisa 
feodalizma v zapadnoj Evrope. (Moskva: Izdat Vysshaja Shkola, 1970). 
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Gurevich cites the thirteenth-century French jurist Beaumanoir who tells us definitively that 
‘there are many types of serfdom.’ (Gurevich, 1983, p.175)  The doleful vision of an 
inescapably hierarchical feudalism, shackling peasants uniformly and inexorably, is obviously 
a gross simplification.  In fact, in his seminal work Feudal Society, Marc Bloch justly remarks 
that such society actually ‘was an unequal society, rather than a hierarchical one.’ (Bloch, 
1964, p.433)  This richer picture evinces economic possibilities that have escaped those 
Marxist historians who tried to trace a too clear-cut transition from feudalism to capitalism.  
The economic implications of the society described by Gurevich are elucidated by Bloch: 
‘The tenant slave on the other hand, had his own dwelling; he subsisted from the produce of 
his own labour; nothing prevented him from selling for his own benefit the surplus of his 
harvest, if there chanced to be any.’ (Bloch, 1964, p.256)  R.H. Britnell, too, in his study on 
the commercialization of England, maintained that ‘the tenant of free land was able to sell his 
property as he pleased’ (Britnell, 1993, p.143) and that thus he entered the markets, since the 
need as well the availability of cash were a reality.  These statements fly in the face of Dobb’s 
theory that ‘surplus labor [tended] to be performed directly as a personal obligation or to take 
the form of the delivery of a certain quota of his produce by the cultivator as a tribute in 
natural form to the overlord.’ (Dobb, 1947, p.13) 
 
And so, we come back to Pirenne, since one of the main problems both his critics and 
supporters have had to grapple is his nebulous concept of the ‘itinerant peasant’, who, 
emerging suddenly from the brumes of history, populated cities, improved his own status, 
increased the division of labor, and acted as a major agent of economic change:  the peasant 
wanderer, in Pirenne’s view, became the burgher who eventually became the modern 
capitalist.  In the light of the previous observations of Gurevich and Bloch it may be possible 
to understand who these peasants were, or at the very least give them plausibility, since the 
heterogeneous society both historians described accounts for peasants who were not 
relentlessly stuck to the clod.  In fact, Gurevich makes a subtle distinction between an “un-
free freedom” and a “free non-freedom”, which can give further credence to Pirenne’s 
wandering peasant:  ‘A clear manifestation of the medieval conscience is that the law is a tie 
between people (a tie in that it binds people together, and a tie also in that it is a restraint); the 
law, thus, is not for everyone; the un-free are not bound by its prescriptions, which are, 
instead, obligatory for free men—even more so for the lords.’ (Gurevich, 1982, p.187) 
 
Conclusion  
 
In this brief survey, we have seen that the fancy that trade and money destroyed feudalism is 
quite untenable in its simplest form: McCormick’s groundbreaking discoveries and the more 
nuanced descriptions of feudalism offered by Bloch and Gurevich have shown quite 
conclusively that to a certain point feudalism fomented capitalism, or, at the very least, was its 
precursor.  The true disintegrating force of feudalism was political centralization.  We thus 
ought to look at feudalism’s passing from a broader perspective—a deep, structural, societal 
mutation, which of course was also due to economic changes.  But what concerns us here is 
the degree to which the economic aspects during the ‘transition’ from a feudal to a capitalist 
economy are in conflict.  Surely, at a certain point of economic expansion, feudal strictures 
wore the emerging capitalist economy, because eventually capitalism operated on a scale that 
necessitated a system that was not fragmented.  This paper though, has attempted to show that 
feudalism’s demise was not due to supposedly new financial conditions, many of which were 
already in place at the very earliest stages of feudalism.  If anything, feudalism might have 
contributed to the rise of capitalism, since we have seen that in effect trade and commerce had 
always existed, but capitalism emerged in different parts of Europe, during the feudal age. 
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